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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published “The Right to Privacy” in 
the Harvard Law Review. They extended the idea of a “right to life” to mean “the 
right to enjoy life” and extended the term “property” to include intangibles. 
Warren & Brandeis argued that the right to privacy not only “prevent[s] 
inaccurate portrayal of private life, but ... prevent[s] its being depicted at all".1 
Legal researchers over the next one-hundred plus years came to consider the 
paper’s identification of privacy with “the right to be let alone” as the birth of the 
concept of the right to privacy.2  
 Bloustein suggested that the modern right to privacy, associated with the 
Warren & Brandeis definition, became a legally significant issue with 
urbanization and mass publicity, modern issues that posed an everyday threat to 
personal dignity through the loss of privacy via the development of new 
technologies and social trends. 3 
Other scholars extended (or limited) the definition of right to privacy 
discussed by Warren & Brandeis. Prosser separated the definition of privacy into 
four different interests: intrusion into private affairs, public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts, publicity creating a false light in the public eye, and 
appropriation of name or likeness.4 Benn echoed Prosser’s definition of private 
affairs, noting that what is done “in-private” encompasses any activity it would 
“be inappropriate for others to try to find out about” or report on without consent.5 
Benn’s definition of private affairs is expansive including personal relations, 
political freedom, and moral autonomy.6  
Bloustein called undue publicity concerning private life “an affront to ... 
human dignity”.7 In Bloustein’s view the right to privacy is a universal human 
right, a concern for individual dignity and independence of will, and a safeguard 
of individual integrity and freedom.  Moreover, he saw privacy as a spiritual 
interest, not simply a property interest; the spiritual characteristic is individuality 
                                                          
1 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4 no. 5 
(Dec. 15, 1890): 193, 218. 
2 Benjamin E. Bratman, “Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to 
Privacy,” Tennessee Law Review 69 (2002): 624.  
3 Edward J. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,” 
New York University Law Review 39 (1964): 984. 
4 William L. Prosser, “Privacy,” 48 California Law Review, (1960): p. 389. 
5Stanley I. Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” in Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An Anthology, ed. Ferdinand David Schoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
223. 
6 Ibid, 234. 
7 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 979. 
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or freedom.8  Without privacy a person loses individual dignity, integrity, 
freedom, and independence.9 Reiman goes so far as to say that privacy is a 
precondition of personhood. 10  
Privacy of information is particularly important because it gives us the 
liberty to manage relationships with different people in different ways.11 People 
use privacy to control access to information about themselves.12 In turn, control 
over one’s own privacy is limited by the rights of others.13 Parent describes 
privacy as having undocumented information about oneself and protecting that 
information from others.14 Hartman sees control as a key feature of privacy, the 
“ability to be autonomous in controlling one’s personal information.”15 Moor 
understands privacy as protection from intrusion, observation, and surveillance; 
he suggests that privacy can be protected by restricted access. 16  Alfino & Mayes 
summarize these various definitions as “the right to restrict access to a personal 
domain”; sometimes that domain is defined by one’s person, sometimes by one’s 
information.17 In the digital age, restricted access to personal information is 
becoming increasingly difficult to accomplish.  
Nissenbaum introduces the concept of contextual integrity, refining the 
idea of a right to privacy by arguing that privacy norms vary by context. Some 
contexts are likely to remain outside the legal system and can be handled by 
societal or professional norms. Applying the idea to public surveillance, however, 
she argues that “when violations of norms are widespread and systematic … when 
strong incentives of self-interest are behind these violations, when the parties 
involved are of radically unequal power and wealth, then the violations take on 
political significance and call for political response.”18 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 1002. 
9 Ibid, 971. 
10 Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 
1(Fall 1976): 39.    
11 James Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (Summer 
1975): 326.  
12 Charles Fried, “Privacy,” in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, ed. Ferdinand 
David Schoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 219. 
13 Ibid, 213. 
14 William A. Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 4 
(1983): 269. 
15 Laura P. Hartman, “Technology and Ethics: Privacy in the Workplace,” Business and Society 
Review 106, no. 1 (March 2001): 10. 
16 James H. Moor, “The Ethics of Privacy Protection,” Library Trends 39, no. 1–2 (Summer & 
Fall 1990): 77, 79. 
17 Mark Alfino and G. Randolph Mayes, “Reconstructing the Right to Privacy,” Social Theory & 
Practice 29, no. 1 (2003): 3. 
18 Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” Washington Law Review 79 (2004): 157. 
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Solove is heavily concerned with information problems created by 
emerging technology. Solove’s taxonomy includes four basic groups of activities 
that harm privacy: (1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) 
information dissemination, and (4) invasion.19 Even if each specific data item is 
protected, elements of these four groups of activities can be combined to breach 
privacy. Solove notes that protecting privacy requires careful balancing, as neither 
privacy nor its countervailing interests are absolute values. Interestingly, he 
argues that while technology enables breaches of privacy, it is the activities of 
people that cause privacy problems.20 Solove argues that privacy rights are not 
well protected because the harm caused by breach of privacy is not well 
articulated.21 
Sometimes personal information has economic value. Acquisti, Taylor, 
and Wagman emphasize the often uneven relationship between individuals’ 
information and the technology organizations that may want to use that 
information to economic advantage.22 Lipman outlines some areas where personal 
information may be collected from poorly or uninformed consumers for economic 
reasons; for instance, some online services are offered without charge because 
valued personal data is collected in the process.23 Economic issues are at the heart 
of the business applications of privacy ethics. It is noteworthy that the writing of 
Warren and Brandeis about privacy was prompted by a newspaper report about 
Warren’s family.24 The newspaper, of course, was in the information business. 
There are countervailing interests between businesses which profit from 
information and those individuals whose information it was originally. Individuals 
want to control whether and when information about themselves is made public. 
A business may want that information because it can generate profit, either 
directly by selling the information as a newspaper might, or indirectly through 
marketing. 
Erlich and Narayanan discuss the tension between value of medical 
information for research and the privacy of the patients.25 Here again information 
has economic value. Even if the medical researchers are not business people as 
                                                          
19 Daniel J. Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154, no. 3 
(2006): 488. 
20 Ibid., 560. 
21 Ibid., 480. 
22 Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor, & Liad Wagman, “The Economics of Privacy,” Journal 
of Economic Literature, 52, no. 2 (2016), Sloan Foundation Economics Research Paper No. 
2580. 
23 Rebecca Lipman, “Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data,” Penn State Law 
Review (2016): 1–34 
24 See description of the event in Prosser, Note 4. 
25 Yaniv Erlich and Arvind Narayanan, “Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy,” 
Nature Reviews Genetics 15, no. 6 (2014): 409–21. 
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such, nevertheless they rely on suppliers of research materials. There may be 
clinical trials using human subjects for research. Tissue samples and genetic data 
sets may be stored and used in numerous experiments. Identities of the human 
subjects are often confidential, but rarely anonymous.  Medical research depends 
on an information “business”. Researchers are both consumers and suppliers of 
information. 
 Orts and Sepinwall as well as Pollman discuss the possible extension of 
property rights to corporations and other organizations in addition to 
individuals.26 Most of the organizations of concern in this regard are business 
corporations including, for example, news media protecting confidential sources 
and software companies protecting private code. 
 
AN ETHICS VIEW OF PRIVACY 
 
In their work, Warren & Brandeis trace the legal support for the right of privacy 
as far back as the fourteenth century and give no indication of considering 
themselves trailblazers. The claim then that Warren & Brandeis are the fathers of 
the right of privacy is disingenuous given how widely studied “The Right to 
Privacy” is and cannot be explained away as a fault of simple oversight. The 
disparity between the manner in which Warren & Brandeis treat their own study 
and the fashion in which later researchers view “The Right to Privacy” demands 
an alternate explanation. The above scholars approach privacy primarily as a legal 
matter; the right to privacy is treated as the backdrop for laws regarding control of 
information. This is particularly relevant in today’s technology and information 
age in which new devices and software make it ever easier to breach privacy 
rights. Typically though, there is an ethical lag in writing laws to address 
problems triggered by new technologies. Where new technology is the enabling 
mechanism, the dilemma is apparent long before there are laws written to protect 
against breach of privacy. The decisions about how and when to introduce new 
technology into common use rests with either product designers or product sellers, 
generally engineers and business people. Any safeguards of privacy rights are 
considered (if at all) by them first. 
 Pollach notes that the law may lag behind what is technologically feasible, 
and consequently advocates for a corporate social responsibility approach to 
addressing privacy issues because there is an imbalance of power between 
                                                          
26 Eric W. Orts and Amy Sepinwall, “Privacy and Organizational Persons,” Minnesota Law 
Review 99 (2014): 2275–2323.  
    Elizabeth Pollman, “A Corporate Right to Privacy.” Minnesota Law Review 99 (2014): 27-88. 
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companies as data collectors and users as data providers. 27 To address privacy 
issues as they emerge, include consideration of privacy rights in corporate and 
government decisions regarding private information, and inform the writing of 
appropriate laws, we must of necessity rely on long-standing ethics to provide a 
framework within which to treat technology-driven problems.  
 An illustration of an ethics view of privacy is Bloustein’s view of privacy as 
a spiritual interest.28 It is the right (as opposed to wrong) way to treat people with 
dignity. Wall also emphasized the ethical basis of privacy rights, defining privacy 
as "the moral right to consent to access by others to one's personal information".29 
Hartman notes that we turn to ethics for guidance when law does not yet provide 
the answers.30 There may be a time lag between the advent of a breach of privacy 
and any laws that may be written to protect against such breach of privacy. 
Decisions in this ambiguous area will need to rely on ethics arguments since 
recourse to relevant laws will at best be relying on legal precedents that were 
originally intended for other kinds of situations or older technologies.    
  Privacy as an ethical principle predates Warren & Brandeis’ article not 
only by centuries, but by millennia. Warren & Brandeis’ innovation was the 
conglomeration of disparate precedents to present the first legal case for a right to 
privacy. The line between the ethic of privacy and the legal right to privacy has 
come to be blurred in the past century of writing on the subject favoring a largely 
legal focus. It is as a result of this attention to privacy as a legal issue that Warren 
& Brandeis have come to be seen as the fathers of concern over privacy. Warren 
& Brandeis themselves, however, were able to cite centuries of precedents 
because as an ethical issue privacy is an age-old concern.  
 This paper examines the development of privacy from an ethical value to a 
legal right through the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts stemming from biblical 
literature, many of which serve as guides to ethical behavior. The following 
discussion draws from millennia of religious texts universal values that lie at the 
heart of the debate over privacy rights. Understanding the general issue of privacy 
through the particular lens chosen here can provide a set of principles with which 
to approach emerging privacy dilemmas and inform the writing of laws to handle 
these dilemmas.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Irene Pollach, “Online Privacy as a Corporate Social Responsibility: An Empirical Study,” 
Business Ethics: A European Review 20, no. 1 (2011): 89.   
28 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 1002. 
29 Edmund Wall, “Privacy and the Moral Right to Personal Autonomy,” International Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2011): 69. 
30 Hartman, “Technology and Ethics,” 16. 
5
Glass and Cahn: Privacy Ethics in Biblical Literature
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2015
PRIVACY IN BIBLICAL LITERATURE 
 
Biblical privacy ethics can inform contemporary privacy ethics, in spite of the 
obvious differences. Solove compares ancient physical invasions of privacy with 
modern informational invasions of privacy, concluding that while different both 
can be considered “privacy”.31 While not called privacy explicitly, and of course 
in the framework of different technology and a different level of business 
development, nevertheless treatment of privacy dilemmas in biblical literature has 
something to say of relevance to contemporary society. Life in the flimsy 
dwellings of biblical communities made privacy fragile, not easy to safeguard, 
just as today electronic communication and storage of information makes privacy 
difficult to safeguard. Today, personal data collected for legitimate business 
purposes may end up in the wrong hands with unintended consequences more 
often than we would like.  
Because of its fragility, individual privacy will exist only to the extent that 
privacy is considered a moral right of inherent value that is important to protect.32 
Development of a moral code and guidelines for right behavior are an important 
part of biblical literature, making it a good place to find guidance on privacy as a 
moral right. 
Biblical literature is particularly instructive for our purposes through its 
attention to the development of rules of ethical behavior. Today we rely on civil 
law codes to redress abridgement of well-established norms of ethical conduct. 
However, especially when newer technology is involved, norms of ethical 
behavior may not have coalesced sufficiently to be written into law. In these 
ambiguous circumstances, it can be instructive to follow the debates and examples 
by which biblical literature develops ethical values. 
The discussion of privacy now turns to considering sources in the Hebrew 
Bible. This is followed by a survey of Talmudic dialogues and debates that 
contribute to the rabbinic legal and broader ethical approach to privacy.33 The 
codifiers’ refine Talmudic dialogue to practical law, completing the evolution of 
biblical discourse from ethics to legal practice.34 
 
PRIVACY IN THE HEBREW BIBLE 
 
This section is divided into four subsections: commandments concerning privacy 
in the Pentateuch, similar commandments in the Prophets and Writings, Privacy 
                                                          
31 Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 560. 
32 Indeed Bloustein, 971, views privacy as inherent to human dignity. 
33 Milton Steinberg, Basic Judaism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 144-147. 
34 Solomon Grayzel, A History of the Jews (New York: The Jewish Publication Society of 
America, 1968), 224.  
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in Pentateuch narrative, and privacy in Prophets and Writings narrative. The 
primary dichotomy in these subdivisions is between commandment and narrative.  
 
Privacy commandments in the Pentateuch 
The Pentateuch contains few commands that indicate an expectation of individual 
privacy. The primary relevant command does not explicitly address privacy, but 
forbids gossip: “You shall not go around as a slanderer among your people” 
(Leviticus 19:16).35 Gossip is a breach of privacy, the act of publicizing one 
person’s personal information and affairs without his knowledge or consent. 
Recall Bloustein’s definition of privacy, citing undue publicity concerning private 
life as “an affront to the plaintiff's human dignity”.36 Unbridled gossip in 
newspapers was the original concern of Warren & Brandeis.37 In forbidding such 
practice, Leviticus 19:16 understands a pre-existing principle valuing privacy. 
Why must one not act as a talebearer? The reason is that the individual is entitled 
to expect privacy. 
Two more verses in the Pentateuch assume an expectation of privacy. 
These two verses comprise a brief passage in Deuteronomy 24: “When you make 
your neighbor a loan of any kind, you shall not go into the house to take the 
pledge. You shall wait outside, while the person to whom you are making the loan 
brings the pledge out to you.” (Deuteronomy 24:10-11). As in Leviticus, the 
command in Deuteronomy assumes an individual’s expectation that his privacy be 
respected. The house is treated as a private domain, as later defined similarly by 
Alfino & Mayes.38 According to Deuteronomy 24:10-11, the privacy of a 
borrower must not be infringed upon by the lender seeking his pledge. Currently 
under debate is the question of whether the notion of private domain should be 
extended from one’s home to one’s electronic data storage devices. Who is 
entitled to enter these electronic domains and see what private information is 
there? 
 
Privacy commandments in the Prophets and Writings 
 
Proverbs 11:13 reads: “A gossip goes about telling secrets, but one who is 
trustworthy in spirit keeps a confidence.” The first half of the verse is the 
negative, the second half is the positive, and the two are contrasted by the 
parallelism. He that “goes about telling secrets” is compared to he that is 
                                                          
35 English translations of verses from the Hebrew Bible are from the New Revised Standard 
Version. 
36 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 979. 
37 Warren & Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 195-196. 
38 Alfino & Mayes, “Reconstructing the Right to Privacy,” 3. 
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“trustworthy in spirit.” In so comparing these two personalities, the verse 
degrades he that “goes about telling secrets” as an unfaithful spirit, while lauding 
he that “keeps a confidence” as demanding higher regard. Proverbs here treats 
favorably those who are reticent with regard to the information of others. 
Proverbs 25:9 provides the following advice: “Argue your case with your 
neighbor directly, and do not disclose another’s secret” (Proverbs 25:9). This 
verse is explicit with regard to respecting another’s privacy. Not only is it 
understood in this verse that one is entitled to privacy, but the act of breaching 
another’s privacy is openly censured. Proverbs advocates for privacy of 
information, the privacy right discussed by Fried, Parent, Hartman, and Solove.39 
 
Privacy in Pentateuch narrative 
 
Several narrative passages shed light on the issue at hand. These passages do not 
directly offer statements concerning privacy, but in composition--tone, character 
portrayal--allude to underlying understandings of the value of privacy.40 
The first such passage appears at the close of the flood narrative. Noah, 
having become a vintner after the end of the flood, becomes intoxicated and is 
found naked in his tent by his son Ham. Ham plays the talebearer and informs his 
brothers of Noah’s state: “And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of 
his father, and told his two brothers outside.” (Genesis 9:22). Ham is a talebearer, 
the behavior forbidden in Leviticus 19:16, and is punished severely, receiving a 
zealous curse from Noah (Genesis 9:24-25). As evidenced by this scene, the 
Pentateuch recognizes the fragility of privacy. The Pentateuch is aware that 
privacy is easily breached, and in chronicling Ham’s admonishment evidences a 
strict aversion to tale bearing. 
Later in Genesis, in the narrative relating Isaac’s sojourn in Gerar, the 
Pentateuch again recognizes the fragile nature of privacy. Traveling to Gerar, 
Isaac tells his wife Rebekah to inform any authorities that may inquire that she is 
his sister; this was done to avoid Isaac’s murder for the sake of acquiring Rebekah 
(Genesis 26:7). The following verse illustrates the local king Abimelech’s 
incidental breach of Isaac and Rebekah’s privacy: “When Isaac had been there a 
long time, King Abimelech of the Philistines looked out of a window and saw him 
fondling his wife Rebekah.” (Genesis 26:8). It seems no mistake that the 
Pentateuch concludes verse eight with the word wife. Abimelech having simply 
“looked out of a window” realized Isaac’s falsehood and was able to conclude on 
                                                          
39 Fried, “Privacy,” 219; Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” 269; Hartman, “Technology 
and Ethics,” 10; and Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 488. 
40 In addition to the passages noted here, Numbers 24:5 is also interpreted as relating to privacy. 
However, since the interpretation that links the verse to the issue of privacy is Talmudic-
Midrashic in origin, it is discussed below in the Talmud section of this paper. 
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his own that Rebekah was Isaac’s wife and not his sister. The ease with which 
privacy is breached, even incidentally, is illustrated in this verse. 
The incident in which Laban confronts Jacob about the disappearance of 
his household gods provides further insight into the Pentateuch’s view of privacy. 
While searching Jacob’s camp, Laban comes upon Rachel, who is responsible for 
the theft of the idols. Sitting on his household gods, Rachel is reluctant to move as 
Laban searches for the idols, lest her crime be revealed: “And she said to her 
father, ‘Let not my lord be angry that I cannot rise before you, for the way of 
women is upon me’” (Genesis 31:35). Laban’s reaction is telling: he respects 
Rachel’s request. Rachel pleaded with her father on the grounds of personal 
privacy to avoid being implicated in the theft of his household gods, and the 
argument carried sufficient weight to convince Laban not to forcibly move her.  
Exodus 2 records the young Moses witnessing an Egyptian beating a 
Hebrew slave and Moses’ reaction. The language of the verse is particularly 
important to the issue here being discussed: “He looked this way and that, and 
seeing no one he killed the Egyptian and hid him in the sand” (Exodus 2:12). 
Moses’ looking “this way and that” indicates his attempt to hide his action, to 
maintain the secrecy of his act. Seeing “no one,” Moses thought that he could 
repay the Egyptian taskmaster for his behavior toward the slave without arousing 
others’ attention. Verse 12 provides an overall sense that Moses acted in utter 
secrecy—he saw there was “no one.” However, in verse 14, after Moses has 
rebuked two quarreling Hebrews, it becomes evident that the secrecy of Moses’ 
act was breached. One of the Hebrews whom Moses rebukes asks Moses if he 
will mete out further punishment as he did to the Egyptian; Moses’ reaction is 
encapsulated in his statement “surely the thing is known” (Exodus 2:14). Though 
Moses took the necessary precautions to ensure the secrecy of his act, somehow 
his action became generally known. In relating this narrative, the Pentateuch 
assumes that no matter the precautions taken, secrecy cannot be guaranteed. 
Secrecy is not equivalent to privacy; secrecy carries with it a more negative 
connotation. Nevertheless, the lesson of the Pentateuch regarding the 
impossibility of guaranteeing secrecy even under seemingly ideal circumstances 
extends to this discussion of the Pentateuch’s approach to privacy. From the 
Pentateuch’s perspective, absolute privacy is not preserved under all 
circumstances; though there may appear to be “no one,” privacy is not always 
assured.41 It is interesting to note that Moses observed the slaves at work, in a 
relatively public place. In this regard the circumstances are different from the 
                                                          
41 It must be noted that in cases of divine intervention in biblical narrative, absolute privacy can be 
guaranteed. Deuteronomy 34:6 records that God buried Moses “in a valley in the land of 
Moab, opposite Beth-peor, but no one knows his burial place to this day.” God can 
guarantee complete privacy; however, on the human level, privacy cannot be expected to be 
absolute. 
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Laban/Rachel situation, which even though apparently out-of-doors, is a personal 
rather than a “work” event. Rachel’s privacy is protected; the slave taskmaster’s is 
not. A modern analogy to this story might be the expectation that privacy of one’s 
person should be respected even outdoors while not at home, although one may 
not expect very much privacy in the workplace. Regard for privacy is 
contextual.42 
 
Privacy in Prophets and Writings narrative 
 
Two particularly illustrative narrative examples in which the issue of privacy 
implicitly plays a part appear in the Prophets and Writings. The first is a scene 
from 2 Samuel, the second from Esther. 
In 2 Samuel 11, David remains in Jerusalem as his generals wage war with 
Ammon (2 Samuel 11:1). The subsequent scene is well known. At home in 
Jerusalem, “walking about on the roof of the king’s house,” David saw a beautiful 
woman bathing (2 Samuel 11:2). The implication of this chance sighting of 
Bathsheba is parallel to the implication in a number of the Pentateuch narratives 
cited above. The text frames the sighting as incidental. Walking on the roof of the 
palace, David incidentally caught sight of Bathsheba. Bathsheba’s privacy was 
invaded upon by David by chance. The chance sighting was an inadvertent 
intrusion into her private affairs, bathing being one of those activities that would 
be inappropriate for others to see, consistent with Benn’s privacy definition.43  
The book of Esther contains a scene that carries allusions regarding 
privacy similar to those found in 2 Samuel 11. Mordecai, “sitting at the king’s 
gate” becomes aware of a plot against the king Ahasuerus (Esther 2:21). Bigthan 
and Teresh, responsible for the plot, were those “who guarded the threshold” 
(Esther 2:21). Mordecai, as one who sat in the “king’s gate” was in close quarters 
with Bigthan and Teresh regularly and thus it is reasonable that Mordecai came to 
be aware of the plot. This is the first of two indications in the narrative of the 
fragile nature of privacy. The second indication is that Mordecai takes it upon 
himself to report the plot to Esther who in turn informs the king. Public disclosure 
of private facts embarrassing to Bigthan and Teresh invades their privacy, 
following Prosser’s definition.44 At the same time, the disclosure safeguards 
Ahasuerus. 
Privacy in the Hebrew Bible is interpreted as a strongly held value, a right, 
but difficult to guarantee. The Bible does not treat lightly any breach of privacy, 
whether intentional or incidental. The Bible directs that one should avoid invading 
another’s privacy, understanding that each person expects his privacy to be 
                                                          
42 As noted more recently by Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity.” 
43 Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” 223. 
44 Prosser, “Privacy,” 389. 
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respected. The Bible thus offers a two-sided approach to privacy: it is understood 
to be fragile and easily violable, but at the same time recognized as a right of high 
regard. 
 
PRIVACY IN THE TALMUD 
 
Where the Bible is terse, the Talmud is expansive. The Talmud elaborates at 
length on the commandments set forth in the Bible. 45  
 
Centrality of Leviticus 19:16 and Proverbs 11:13 
 
In the Talmudic discussions on privacy, Leviticus 19:16 emerges as the primary 
Bible source outlining a right to privacy. Proverbs 11:13 likewise is indicated as a 
particularly relevant source in Talmudic deliberations on privacy. The Mishnah 
on Sanhedrin 29a offers the following question and answer: 
 
“And whence do we know that he [one of the judges] when leaving 
[the court], must not say, ‘I was for acquittal whilst my colleagues 
were for conviction, but what could I do, seeing that they were in 
the majority?’--of such a one is it written: thou shalt not go about 
as a talebearer among thy people, and again, he that goeth about as 
a talebearer revealeth secrets.”46 
 
The case described in this Mishnah is straightforward: a judge must not release to 
the public his opinion in the case. A judge’s opinion in a case of conviction is 
intended to be private.47 In support of this ruling concerning privacy, the Mishnah 
cites two verses. The first is Leviticus 19:16, the source that forbids gossip and 
thereby provides an opening for Bible-based law regarding privacy. The second is 
Proverbs 11:13, which censures tale bearing. 
                                                          
45 Grayzel, A History of the Jews, 194-196, 219, 222. Grayzel explains the reason for the sheer 
volume of material in the Talmud. The Talmud is the record of many generations of rabbinic 
study. The Talmudic method of teaching began with a master teaching his disciples. The 
generations of teachings and discussions developed into what was ultimately compiled into 
the Talmud. Around the year 200 C.E., rabbinic codes that had long been transmitted orally 
were written down in the terse form of the Mishnah. From then until approximately 500 
C.E., rabbinic scholars elaborated on the Mishnah via dialectical teaching. The Talmud 
comprises the combination of the Mishnah and accompanying elaboration of the Gemara, 
together covering some 500 years of rabbinic teaching stemming from the commands of the 
Hebrew Bible. 
46 Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud. (Soncino Press, 1969), Sanhedrin 29a. All 
other Talmud citations are from this translation. 
47 Sanhedrin 2a.The court was composed of a panel of judges. While the court verdict was 
reported, each individual judge’s opinion was private.  
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Privacy of the judges, both for and against, are protected this way. The 
court is a workplace situation, not a private domain. Still, privacy of an 
exonerated defendant is enhanced by keeping individual judges’ opinions secret. 
 
Privacy as a biblical concern  
 
Recognizing Leviticus 19:16 as an indication of the value of privacy to an 
individual, the Talmud understands a biblical expectation of privacy springing 
directly from God.  
As a biblical principle, privacy protection is treated in the Talmud as a 
highly sensitive issue deserving meticulous attention. The opening Mishnah of 
tractate Baba Bathra states that adjacent properties should have walls separating 
them and that windows and doors of adjacent properties must not allow residents 
to visually invade the privacy of their neighbors.48 The concern in Baba Bathra is 
for personal privacy. The Rabbis engaged in these discussions recognize that 
privacy is fragile and that for those in the position of neighbors to one another, 
opportunities for intentional and incidental breaches of privacy are to be 
anticipated and avoided. Foreshadowing Moor, the Talmud advocates that privacy 
be protected from intrusion. 49 
 
Privacy as a modesty concern 
 
Concern over protection of privacy in the Talmud is buttressed by the concept of 
modesty as a virtue. A case appears in tractate Baba Metziah that relates to 
privacy via modesty. The Talmud states that one case in which it is permissible to 
“conceal the truth” is a case of the “bed.” The commentator Rashi offers 
explanation of this somewhat cryptic statement, expanding that one is permitted to 
conceal the details of personal affairs, as between man and wife, for the sake of 
modesty. In other words, for the sake of protecting sensitive private information, 
one may indulge in white lies.50 According to this discussion, privacy is a 
modesty-based right, reminiscent of Benn’s definition of private affairs as those 
activities that would be inappropriate for others to find out about or report on 
without consent.51 
A similar discussion in the Talmud appears in Baba Bathra. In the course 
of discussing a Mishnah outlining the requirement that windows and doors of 
neighboring houses not face each other for the sake of privacy, as discussed 
above, a quote from Numbers arises as a source. 
                                                          
48 Baba Bathra 2b, 59a, 60a. 
49 Moor, “The Ethics of Privacy Protection,” 77. 
50 Baba Metziah 23b. 
51 Benn, “Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,” 223. 
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 Mishnah: In a courtyard which he shares with others a man should 
not open a door facing another person’s door nor a window facing 
another person’s window. If it is small he should not enlarge it, and 
he should not turn one into two. On the side of the street, however, 
he may make a door facing another person’s door and a window 
facing another person’s window, and if it is small he may enlarge it 
or he may make two out of one. 
 
Gemara: Whence are these rules derived? --R. Johanan said: From 
the verse of the Scripture, And Balaam lifted up his eyes and he 
saw Israel dwelling according to their tribes. This indicates that he 
saw the doors of their tents did not exactly face one another, 
whereupon he exclaimed: Worthy are these that the Divine 
presence should rest upon them!52  
 
The Gemara on Baba Bathra 60a thus introduces a citation from Numbers to link 
the concern of privacy rooted in modesty to the Bible. Why, the Rabbis ask, did 
Balaam bless Israel saying “how fair are your tents, O Jacob, your encampments, 
O Israel” (Numbers 24:5). The reason is that the tents were arranged in a fashion 
that was modest. Balaam perceived, as Rachels does, that privacy is important to 
interpersonal relationships. 53 The value of modesty is thus considered to have 
derived from the Bible. The value of privacy, concern over which can be seen as 
an outgrowth of concern over modesty as seen above in the cases from Baba 
Metziah and Baba Bathra, is thus rooted in the Bible via considerations of 
modesty. 
A modern corollary to those privacy-sensitive buildings would be 
businesses that collect a minimum rather than a maximum of information when 
dealing with their customers and other stakeholders. Customers can be prompted 
to opt in to information sharing rather than being offered the option to opt out. It 
is the less invasive option. 
 
Breaches of privacy 
 
The Talmud makes clear through presentation of these legends, that privacy is a 
concern of the utmost gravitas.  
The Talmudic sensitivity to privacy and breach of privacy is seen in Baba 
Metziah 58b, in which Rab Nahman ben Isaac is quoted as stating that he who 
speaks ill of another in public is as if responsible for “shedding [the subject’s] 
                                                          
52 Baba Bathra 60a. 
53 Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” 326. 
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blood.”54 In recording this statement, the Talmud elevates breach of another’s 
privacy to a crime considered in essence to be on the level of a capital offense.55 
Treating breach of privacy as a heinous crime, the Talmud demanded strict 
measures of punishment for the offense. On the issue of punishment for breach of 
privacy, the case of a disciple who failed to keep secret sensitive information 
discussed before his teacher; the teacher expelled the disciple for his privacy-
breaching misconduct.56 This passage in the Talmud indicates that even for a 
breach of privacy that may seem benign, strict punishment is justified. 
By extension to contemporary parallels, this incident reported in the 
Talmud suggests an ethical mandate to avoid customers who will not respect the 
privacy rights of others. A particular burden falls on media businesses, whose 
“product” is information. The Talmud’s perspective would advocate for 
protection of confidential news sources and for the privacy of professional-client 
relationships. 
 As with the Bible, the Talmud recognizes the fragility of privacy; 
however, the Talmud is more emphatic in its treatment of the subject. Where the 
Bible tersely forbids going “around as a slanderer,” the Talmud provides 
illustrative narratives and discussions that not only forbid playing the talebearer, 
but dictate punitive measures that a talebearer merits in response to his actions. 
 
PRIVACY IN THE CODES OF LAW 
 
The codes of law translate the ethical dictates of the Hebrew Bible into concrete 
law via the precedents set by the dialogues in the Talmud. Grayzel writes that 
“not finding exact duplications” to their contemporary legal concerns, Jews 
throughout the generations searched for parallels in the Talmud that could serve 
as the bases for practical religious law and codes of conduct.57 Two of the most 
widely-referenced rabbinic codifiers, Moses Maimonides and Joseph Karo, are 
referenced in the following discussion.58 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Baba Metziah 58b. 
55 See also Sanhedrin 44b on not exposing the secrets of another. 
56 Sanhedrin 31a. 
57 Grayzel, A History of the Jews, 224. 
58 Ibid, 300-302, 407-408. Maimonides was born in Cordova, Spain in 1135 and was living in 
Cairo, Egypt at the time of his death in 1204. His law code, the Mishneh Torah (Repetition 
of the Teaching) was the first “topically” organized compilation of rabbinic law. Karo was 
born in Toledo, Spain in 1488 and died in Safed, Israel in 1575. He wrote a code of law, 
known as the Shulhan Aruch (The Prepared Table) to guide daily behavior. Karo’s code 
soon became a primary standard and continues to be referenced as such. 
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Laws derived from Leviticus 19:16  
 
Maimonides, in his Book of the Commandments, refers to Leviticus 19:16 as a 
biblical negative commandment that speaks for itself in prohibiting gossip.59 In 
his Repetition of the Teaching, however, Maimonides expands on Leviticus 19:16 
providing ethical insight into the law derived from the verse. He states that not 
only is gossip forbidden, but it “brings about the destruction of the world,” it is an 
offense equal in enormity to the three grand offenses of murder, illicit sexual 
relations, and idolatry.60 The anti-gossip polemic continues with the assertion 
derived from Psalms 12:5 that one who engages in gossip “kills” the speaker, 
listener, and subject.61 To Maimonides, the legal right to privacy is grounded in 
sacred ethical principles. 
The step from Talmudic debate to law is evident in Karo’s code, just as 
the bridge between ethics and the law is evident in Maimonides’ code. Working 
with the passages in Sanhedrin 29a and Sanhedrin 31a discussed above, Karo 
records prohibitions against the public release of the identities of litigants in a 
lawsuit.62 The suits may be revisited for the sake of developing case law, but 
discussion must proceed guardedly, protecting the identities of the parties 
involved.63 Karo only allows confidential use of this personal information for the 
purpose of developing law to protect others, otherwise the privacy of personal 
information is protected. By modern analogy, Karo’s point of view would support 
using “anonymized” personal data for medical research that might benefit others, 
but would not support the use of private data for targeted marketing. 
These codes of law are in agreement that the prohibition against tale 
bearing and the understood requirement to protect individual privacy are rooted in 
a biblical commandment. Legal protection for privacy in the law codes is thus 
derived from Leviticus 19:16. Basing these codes on earlier biblical moral 
literature is an ancient illustration of how ethics precedes formal laws. 
 
Laws derived from Deuteronomy 24:10-11  
 
The practical law derived from Deuteronomy 24:10-11 corresponds exactly with 
the words of the verses. The verses outline a number of prohibitions and 
requirements: (i) not entering a borrower’s house to exact payment, (ii) standing 
                                                          
59 Moses Maimonides. Mishneh Torah. (Jerusalem: El Hamekoroth Ltd., 1956), Sefer Hamitzvot, 
Negative Commandment 301. 
60 Ibid, Hilkhot Deot, 7:2-3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Joseph Karo. Shulhan Arukh (Jerusalem: El Hamekoroth Ltd., 1956), Hoshen Mishpat, 19: 1-2. 
These laws are discussed in greater depth below. 
63 Ibid. 
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outside the house in dealings with the borrower, and (iii) waiting for the borrower 
himself to enter his house and deliver his payment (Deuteronomy 24:10-11). 
In his work, Karo codifies the commandments in these verses into law, 
stating that neither a lender nor messengers of a court may force entry into the 
domain of a borrower for restitution.64 Judges and court representatives must 
remain outside the house while the borrower himself is responsible for production 
and delivery of due payments.65 These laws concretize the ethic of the sanctity of 
the private domain, as it is expressed in the Pentateuch. Alfino & Mayes, writing 
more recently, echo the importance of the privacy of the personal domain.66 If the 
right to a private domain is extended to digital devices, a court may require 
turning over needed data, such as information needed by police to investigate a 
crime, but the court may not require keys or passcodes to the device itself (which 
is a private domain). 
 
Laws derived from Proverbs 11:13 
 
The law derived from Proverbs 11:13 is similar to a portion of the law derived 
from Leviticus 19:16. This is to be expected given the similarity between the two 
verses. Leviticus 19:16 forbids the act of tale bearing and Proverbs 11:13 censures 
the talebearer himself.  
Karo condenses the Talmudic discussion of Proverbs 11:13 into concise 
laws. He states that after passing judgment in a legal case and leaving the 
courtroom, a judge may not disclose his opinion on a case or his deliberation on 
the case with his fellow judges.67 Further, Karo writes that in the codification of 
law, a judge must maintain the anonymity of the parties involved in the legal 
precedent he uses as his basis.68 The law protects the personal privacy of parties 
involved in a lawsuit regardless of the significance of the case. Here the privacy 
of personal information is protected even though it may be of value to others.  
 
IRREVERSIBILITY AND FRAGILITY OF PRIVACY 
 
Two universal themes emerge from the treatment of the value of privacy in 
biblical and rabbinic literature. The first is the irreversibility of privacy and the 
second the potential for privacy rights to conflict with other ethical rights. 
 The Hebrew Bible and successive rabbinic works demonstrate that privacy 
looms large as an ethical concern because a breach of privacy is irreversible. A 
                                                          
64 Ibid, 97: 6, 14. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Alfino & Mayes, “Reconstructing the Right to Privacy,” 3. 
67 Karo, Hoshen Mishpat, 19: 1-2. 
68 Ibid. 
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single invasion of privacy embodies a permanent removal of information from a 
personal to a larger, more public, domain. This concept is demonstrated through 
several of the biblical and Talmudic narratives cited above, along with the notion 
that privacy is fragile and can be breached inadvertently to grievous 
consequences. 
 In happening upon Noah and shaming him, Ham breaches his father’s 
private domain (Genesis 9:22). The consequences of Ham’s actions are 
irreversible not only for Noah, who has been humiliated before his sons even after 
being saved by God for his prior record of virtuous behavior, but for Ham 
himself. The descendants of Ham are eternally cursed as a result of their 
progenitor’s indiscretion (Genesis 9:25). 
 The story of Isaac’s sojourn in Gerar demonstrates the fragility of privacy 
and the ease with which privacy can be invaded. Abimelech looks out of a 
window and discovers, seemingly inadvertently, that Rebekah was Isaac’s wife 
and not his sister as Isaac had told him (Genesis 26:8). Once the truth is known, it 
cannot be made private again, and Abimelech makes a public declaration that 
Isaac must not be harmed by any locals (Genesis 26:9). Abimelech’s public 
declaration guarantees that Isaac and Rebekah’s secret is irreversibly divulged. 
Isaac and Rebekah’s privacy was fragile; their relationship was discovered by 
chance, yet the knowledge is irreversible.  
 Moses, “seeing no one” metes out vigilante justice against an Egyptian 
taskmaster, expecting his action to remain undiscovered (Exodus 2:12). Yet soon 
“the thing is known” (Exodus 2:14). When Moses learns that his act was not 
hidden as he expected, he flees the wrath of Pharaoh, never to regain his former 
status (Exodus 2:15-16). Believing that one is acting in private does not guarantee 
that it is so according to this narrative. 
David sights Bathsheba bathing by chance, invading a private affair if 
from a distance (2 Samuel 11:2). Bathsheba’s privacy was fragile. David’s mere 
sighting of Bathsheba inspired him to set in motion a chain of events with dire, 
irreversible consequences for Bathsheba as well as himself.69  
Mordecai, simply sitting “at the king’s gate”, becomes aware of a plot by 
Bigthan and Teresh against King Ahasuerus (Esther 2:21). He uses this 
information which he happened upon by chance to blow the whistle on the 
conspirators. The privacy of their plot was fragile, and the inadvertent invasion of 
their privacy led to their executions (Esther 2:23). These biblical narratives are all 
situations where information believed to be private was inadvertently made public 
with irreversible consequences.  
                                                          
69 David arranges the death of Uriah the Hittite in order to marry Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11:21). 
This brings the wrath of God upon David from which he cannot escape (2 Samuel 11:27, 
12). 
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The rabbinic scholars of the Talmud recognized the implications couched 
in this list of narrative examples regarding the fragility and irreversibility of 
breaches of privacy. Hence, Baba Bathra anticipates breaches of privacy and 
demands that neighboring properties have walls and windows situated to guard 
the personal domain. Privacy-sensitive buildings should be designed so that there 
is a low likelihood of breaching a neighbor’s privacy by chance.70  
The common moral lesson running through these biblical scenes is that the 
individual deserves to be protected from public encroachment into the personal 
domain. As a counterpoint to this expectation, there exists an obligation for every 
individual and organization to respect other individuals’ privacy.  
Even before protective laws are written, each individual’s privacy should 
be respected by everyone from the passerby on a public avenue, to the corporate 
executive, to the government official. One failure to live up to the ethical 
obligation to guard another’s privacy rights, however benign, could irreversibly 
impact and invade the affected individual’s personal domain.  
Mindful of the ease of transmission of contemporary digital information, 
maintaining anonymity of private information requires cognizance of Solove’s 
admonition that people can breach privacy not only by collecting lists of data but 
also by combinations of events that enable the connection of data elements that 
are revealing when looked at together.71  
Once something is public you lose control over it. This is especially true 
of information on the internet. Data can be either useful or anonymous but not 
both.72 Even when data has been “anonymized” some outside data can be 
combined with it to reveal its source, to “deanonymize” it.73 In fact, the term 
“anonymized” is a misnomer; such data is merely confidential, it can be 
uncovered. The only way to truly keep data anonymous is not to reveal it in the 
first place. In this regard opt-in to data sharing is preferred to opt-out. Data 
storage with personal control is preferred to cloud storage which inherently lacks 
privacy. Transparency is key; it should be clear to the person whose information 
is being collected which information is collected and what will be done with that 
information. Privacy rights are particularly vulnerable to abuse when there is size 
asymmetry between an individual’s information and a large organization.74 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Baba Bathra 2b, 59a, 60a. 
71 See note 19. 
72 Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization,” UCLA Law Review 57 (2010): 1701.  
73 Dan Grech, “Those Prying Eyes,” Princeton Alumni Weekly, January 8, 2014. 
74 Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity.” 
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PRIVACY AND VALUE CONFLICTS 
 
As careful as the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic literature are to emphasize the value 
of privacy, they recognize that privacy is only one of an array of values. As such, 
it is inevitable that the values underlying the right to privacy will on occasion 
come into conflict with values underlying other rights. In fact the possibility of 
conflicting rights and the resultant need to prioritize some over others is true of all 
rights; if there are multiple rights there may be occasions when those rights 
conflict. Biblical and rabbinic literature provide case studies that guide the 
management of value conflicts of this kind and provide a template for how to 
prioritize rights in conflict. 
 Genesis 31 and Deuteronomy 24 indicate that privacy supersedes property 
rights. The former source is the narrative in which Laban, out of respect for 
Rachel’s privacy, does not compel her “rise before” him in his search for his 
household gods (Genesis 31:35). The latter source is the commandment that the 
right of a lender to collect what is due him by a borrower is subordinated to the 
right of the borrower to maintain the privacy of his home (Deuteronomy 24:10-
11). These two cases accord the rights of privacy priority above property rights 
and in such cases, privacy even takes priority over transparency. 
In cases of criminal prosecution, privacy is relegated to a subsidiary 
position. Moses was unable to maintain the privacy of information about the 
murder he committed (Exodus 2:12, 14). Mordecai in an analogous narrative was 
rewarded greatly for his passing along of Bigthan and Teresh’s plotting against 
the king (Esther 6). In both scenes, a breach of privacy uncovers a life-threat. As 
precious as privacy is, life is more so. The biblical narrations here are raising the 
right of the public to security and protection from harm above the right to privacy 
in cases where life is threatened. 
The above biblical excerpts appear to prioritize privacy rights at an 
intermediate level between civil and criminal rights. Where information has 
economic value, then privacy takes precedence over economic usefulness. Only 
where there is an immediate threat to life is the right to privacy superseded.  
It seems unlikely, however, that any future practical case would fit such 
strict and easily defined boundaries. It is difficult to anticipate how multiple rights 
may conflict in a future situation. Individuals may disagree about the relative 
value of their privacy in conflict with other rights. Particularly in situations where 
private information has an imputed economic value, individuals may differ in 
their monetary estimates of the value of private information.75  
In the case of group or joint ownership private property or private 
information may be shared among several individuals. Since individuals may 
                                                          
75 This is the economic concept of utility. 
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place different relative values on their privacy rights, there may be honest 
disagreement over what to do, which in turn will infringe on the rights of at least 
one of the owners. In the question of privacy rights of organizations there will 
almost certainly be differences of opinion. 
The Hebrew Bible treats privacy value conflicts through several unique 
narratives, approaching such issues on a case-by-case basis. Analogously 
contemporary value conflicts should be accorded the importance of a unique 
event because of the hazard of irreversibility. The general priority pattern 
expressed in biblical literature and legislated in rabbinic literature, valuing life 
above privacy which is in turn above economic value can inform treatment of 
contemporary value conflicts. All the same, for privacy problems triggered by 
emerging technology relying on ethics to weigh relative values offers the 
possibility of recognizing unique new issues, where laws may have been 
developed with older technology in mind. 
Recent scholars discuss privacy value conflicts without coming to 
systematic conclusions. Westin discusses the difficulty of balancing privacy and 
competing interests, particularly in areas not yet covered by law.76 He addresses 
the conflict between the right to privacy and the right to transparent information, 
as well as the conflict between privacy and surveillance, a clash that is 
progressively heightened as advancing technology makes it easier and cheaper to 
gather information without participation and consent. Solove also discusses the 
need to balance values that are not absolute.77 Bloustein concludes that in each 
situation we are still left with the dilemma of deciding whether some 
countervailing public policy or social interest justifies an invasion of privacy.78 
Solove notes that combinations of events might abridge privacy, even if any one 
alone does not.79 The lingering ambiguity argues in favor of the biblical approach 
of treating each privacy conflict as a unique event demanding moral scrutiny, 
keeping existing laws in mind but recognizing in each conflict its own inherent 
priorities and unique resolution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Concern over privacy has been growing in recent years in the face of an apparent 
impending loss of privacy. With every new device that makes the world a more 
networked place, opportunities for loss of privacy are also created.  
Recent business examples with privacy ambiguities are dominated by 
information technology. Cloud computing and information storage puts vast 
                                                          
76 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom. (New York: Atheneum 1967), 369. 
77 Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy,” 560. 
78 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity,” 1004. 
79 Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy.” 
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amounts of personal data in a place where even if collection and storage of data 
elements is privacy-protected the data can be processed and linked to be very 
revealing. Social media both collects and reveals personal information. Online 
health records are a convenience for health care workers and a treasure trove for 
medical researchers, but their economic value makes them a tempting business 
resource either to target customers for product marketing or to deny service to 
potentially high risk clients. Personal robots (once the stuff of science fiction 
movies) hold the promise of extending health care services to underserved 
communities such as the remote or the elderly, but they also collect troves of 
personal behavior information. Companies market products designed to collect 
information by parents, employers, or suspicious spouses from target individuals 
who may not be aware of it. Businesses may use claims to privacy rights as a 
defense to safeguard their relationship with their customers.80 Differential privacy 
is a recent privacy protection technique for digital data.81 But this algorithm-based 
protection of confidential information may also turn out to be another iteration in 
the anonymization—reidentification cycle. 
One generation of technology develops a way to protect confidential 
information while the next generation of technology finds a way to uncover the 
identity of its source. The anonymization—reidentification cycle is never ending 
as science and technology move ever forward. Surveillance of all sorts is 
becoming easier, less expensive and more pervasive; personal information is 
collected by remote data gathering in nontransparent ways. Big data collected 
robotically can be used to scoop up private information that has economic value. 
Social media spread information rapidly making private information irreversibly 
public. Cameras in public places and chips in a wide array of products can track 
nearly every move. Information can be easily reused without permission and 
sometimes even without knowledge. The lines between public work life and 
private home life are more and more blurred; carrying smartphones from place-to-
place makes it hard to disconnect one from the other. Often technology-enabling 
collection of information precedes the development of technology that can 
safeguard that information. Tools for guarding information are born only after 
tools for collecting information have already begun to invade the personal 
domain. 
 Encroachments on privacy may emerge before laws can be crafted to 
regulate where privacy is to be protected and where public interest takes 
                                                          
80 For recent examples see Katie Benner, and Nicole Perlroth, “For Apple’s CEO, a Journey to 
Bulwark for Digital Privacy,” The New York Times, February 18, 2016, and Julia Angwin, 
“What They Know,” Wsj.com doi:http://www.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-know-digital-
privacy.html (accessed February 21, 2016). 
81 Dwork, Cynthia. “The Promise of Differential Privacy: A Tutorial on Algorithmic Techniques,” 
in Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 
(2011): 1-2.  
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precedence. Business decision makers and crafters of public policy make choices 
in this ambiguous time between the appearance of privacy-breaching concerns 
and the development of laws protecting privacy. Thoughtful choices on the part of 
these decision-makers, in the absence of laws, require reliance on a framework of 
long-standing ethics. Where the law is unable to keep up with the change of the 
times, ethical codes passed from one generation to the next provide guiding 
insight. As the ethical treatment of privacy in the Hebrew Bible preceded the legal 
treatment in the rabbinic codes of law, so must an ethical standard be adhered to 
in modern times as the law struggles to keep up with privacy-invasive 
technologies and social structures. 
Given the fragile nature of privacy and the irreversibility of information 
disclosure, it is best to err on the side of privacy protection. The irreversibility of 
the release of private information must be born in mind when privacy rights 
conflict with other values. The default assumption regarding an individual’s 
expectation of privacy should be that he or she would prefer to opt in rather than 
opt out of information sharing. A business would be taking the ethical high road 
to offer customers the opportunity to opt into sharing information rather than to 
collect personal information up front and leave the possibility to opt out in the 
fine print. Once shared, information cannot be made private again and it is 
imperative that this irreversibility be recognized and respected. 
The right to privacy and the obligation to respect others’ privacy are 
ethical values held dear among other strongly held ethical values. It is inevitable 
that privacy and other ethical rights will sometimes clash. The ethical teaching of 
biblical literature is that privacy must be carefully protected, short of facilitating 
loss of life. Extending the biblical generality to contemporary privacy rights 
conflicts would justify abridging privacy rights for the sake of protecting life. But 
privacy protection should take precedence over non-life-threatening issues, such 
as protecting employers’ property rights, commercial value of information, and 
even transparency. 
It is important to recognize, however, that there is no one-size-fits-all 
solution and that privacy is not an absolute right. Any decision in a value-conflict 
case dealing with privacy issues—governmental, corporate, media—must, at a 
minimum be transparent about how the values involved are prioritized. 
Information collection must be justified to those individuals who are relinquishing 
their right to privacy in such a way that the individuals are aware of what value 
overrode their right “to be let alone.”82 
The right to privacy is an extension of the right to be treated with respect 
and extends the definition of the self outward including one’s body, dignity, 
information, and property. The biblical ethic supports this sentiment. Upholding 
the right to privacy as an avenue of self-protection and defense of personal 
                                                          
82 Warren & Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 193. 
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modesty is central to the biblical ethic and should inform the contemporary ethic 
of privacy.  
Nevertheless, to the biblical mind, privacy is not absolute; it is understood 
that God is omniscient. Attempts to hide from God recorded in the Bible are 
futile.83 The biblical ethic does not recognize a state of absolute privacy, as 
according to biblical philosophy all men stand before omniscient God. The 
demand of community life is the balance of the openness of the family and the 
distance of impersonal society. In such an environment, one is aware that in 
public one must conduct oneself properly, as the public is the realm of communal 
eyes. In private, however, the biblical approach recognizes solely the ever-
watchful eyes of God. 
 
                                                          
83 As with Adam and Eve who failed to hide from God after their sin in the Garden of Eden 
(Genesis 3:8-24) and Jonah who failed to flee from his commission (Jonah 1:3-2:1). 
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